Individuals often interpret the same event in different ways. How do personality traits modulate 15 brain activity evoked by a complex stimulus? Here we report results from a naturalistic paradigm 16 designed to draw out both neural and behavioral variation along a specific dimension of interest, 17 namely paranoia. Participants listen to a narrative during functional MRI describing an ambiguous 18 social scenario, written such that some individuals would find it highly suspicious, while others 19 less so. Using inter-subject correlation analysis, we identify several brain areas that are 20 differentially synchronized during listening between participants with high-and low trait-level 21 paranoia, including theory-of-mind regions. Follow-up analyses indicate that these regions are 22 more active to mentalizing events in high-paranoia individuals. Analyzing participants' speech as 23 they freely recall the narrative reveals semantic and syntactic features that also scale with paranoia. 24
That different individuals may see the same event in different ways is a truism of human 27 nature. Examples are found at many scales, from low-level perceptual judgments to interpretations 28 of complex, extended scenarios. This latter phenomenon is known as the "Rashomon effect" 1 after 29 a 1950 Japanese film in which four eyewitnesses give contradictory accounts of a crime and its 30 aftermath, raising the point that for multifaceted, emotionally charged events, there may be no 31 single version of the truth. 32
What accounts for these individual differences in interpretation? Assuming everyone has 33 access to the same perceptual information, personality traits may bias different individuals toward 34 one interpretation or another. Paranoia is one such trait, in that individuals with strong paranoid 35 tendencies may be more likely to assign a nefarious interpretation to otherwise neutral events 2 . 36
While paranoia in its extreme is a hallmark symptom of schizophrenia and other psychoses, trait-37 level paranoia exists as a continuum rather than a dichotomy 3,4 : on a behavioral level, up to 30 38 percent of people report experiencing certain types of paranoid thoughts (e.g., 'I need to be on my 39 guard against others') on a regular basis 5 and trait paranoia in the population follows an 40 exponential, rather than bimodal, distribution 6 . 41
Few neuroimaging studies have investigated paranoia as a continuum; the majority simply 42 contrast healthy controls and patients suffering from clinical delusions. However, a handful of 43 reports from subclinical populations describe patterns of brain activity that scale parametrically 44 with tendency toward paranoid or delusional ideation. For example, it has been reported that 45 higher-paranoia individuals show less activity in the medial temporal lobe during memory retrieval 46 and less activity in the cerebellum during sentence completion 7 , less activity in temporal regions 47 during social reflection 8 and auditory oddball detection 9 , but higher activity in the insula and 48 medial prefrontal cortex during self-referential processing 10 and differential patterns of activity in 49 these regions as well as the amygdala while viewing emotional pictures 11 . 50 Such highly controlled paradigms enable precise inferences about evoked brain activity, 51 but potentially at the expense of real-world validity. For example, brain response to social threat 52 is often assessed with decontextualized static photographs of unfamiliar faces presented rapidly in 53 series 12 . Compare this to threat detection in the real world, which involves perceiving and 54 interacting with both familiar and unfamiliar faces in a rich, dynamic social context. Paranoid 55 thoughts that eventually reach clinical significance usually have a slow, insidious onset, involving 56 complex interplay between a person's intrinsic tendencies and his or her experiences in the world. 57
In studying paranoia and other trait-level individual differences, then, is important to complement 58 highly controlled paradigms with more naturalistic stimuli. 59
Narrative is an attractive paradigm for several reasons. First, narrative is an ecologically 60 valid way to study belief formation in action. Theories of fiction posit that readers model narratives 61 in a Bayesian framework in much the same way as real-world information 13 , and story 62 comprehension and theory-of-mind processes share overlapping neural resources 14 . Second, a 63 standardized narrative stimulus provides identical input, so any variation in interpretation reflects 64 individuals' intrinsic biases in how they assign salience, learn and form beliefs. Third, from a 65 neuroimaging perspective, narrative listening is a continuous, engaging task that involves much of 66 the brain 15 and yields data lending itself to innovative, data-driven analyses such as inter-subject 67 correlation 16, 17 . 68
Previous work has shown that experimenters can manipulate patterns of brain activity 69 during naturalistic stimuli by explicitly instructing participants to focus on different aspects of the 70 stimulus. For example, Cooper et al. reported that activity patterns in temporal and frontal regions 71 varied according to whether listeners were told to pay attention to action-, space-or time-related 72 features of short stories 18 . Lahnakoski et al. showed participants the same movie twice, asking 73 them to adopt different perspectives each time, and found differences in neural synchrony 74 depending on which perspective had been taken 19 . Most recently, Yeshurun et al. presented 75 participants with a highly ambiguous story with at least two plausible-but very different-76 interpretations, and used explicit primes to bias each participant toward one interpretation or the 77 other. Responses in higher-order brain areas, including default mode, were more similar among 78 participants who had received the same prime, indicating that shared beliefs have a powerful effect 79 on how individuals perceive an identical stimulus 20 . However, while informative, these studies 80 have all relied on an explicit prime or instruction; they cannot explain why individuals often 81 spontaneously arrive at different interpretations of the same stimulus. 82
In this work, we use participants' intrinsic personality traits as an implicit prime, relating 83 individual differences in trait paranoia to brain activity during a naturalistic task in which 84 participants are faced with complex, ambiguous social circumstances. Using an original narrative, 85 we show that while much of the brain is synchronized across all participants during story listening, 86 stratifying participants based on trait paranoia reveals an additional set of regions with stereotyped 87 activity only among high-paranoia individuals; many of these are regions involved in theory-of-88 mind and mentalizing. An encoding model of the task suggests that these regions, including the 89 temporal pole and medial prefrontal cortex, are particularly sensitive to "mentalizing events" when 90 the main character is experiencing an ambiguous social interaction or explicitly reasoning about 91 other characters' intentions. Finally, we measure participants' behavioral reactions to the narrative 92 by analyzing their speech as they freely recall the story, and identify semantic and syntactic 93 features that vary dimensionally with trait paranoia. Together, results indicate that a personality 94 trait, in this case paranoia, can modulate both neural and behavioral responses to a single stimulus 95 across individuals. 96 97 98 RESULTS 99 100
Behavioral data and task performance 101
We created a fictional narrative to serve as the stimulus for this study. The narrative 102 described a main character faced with a complex social scenario that was deliberately ambiguous 103 with respect to the intentions of certain characters; it was designed such that different individuals 104 would interpret the events as more nefarious and others as less so. A synopsis of the story is given 105 in Supplementary Note 1. 106 Twenty-two healthy participants listened to a pre-recorded audio version of the narrative 107 (total duration = 21:50 min:sec, divided into three parts) during fMRI scanning. Following each 108 of the three parts, participants answered three challenging multiple-choice comprehension 109 questions to ensure they had been paying attention. Performance was very accurate (15 of the 22 110 subjects answered 9/9 [100%] questions correctly, while five answered 8/9 [89%] correctly and 111 two answered 7/9 [78%] correctly). Self-report data indicated that subjects generally found the 112 narrative engaging and easy to pay attention to (engagement rating on a scale of 1 to 5: mean = During a separate behavioral visit one week prior to the scan, participants completed 116 several self-report questionnaires and behavioral tasks to assess personality traits and cognitive 117 abilities (see Fig. 1a for a schematic of the experimental protocol). Our primary measure of interest 118 was subscale A from the Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale 21 (GPTS-A), henceforth referred to 119 as trait paranoia score. We administered this scale on a different day, and placed it amongst other 120 tasks unrelated to paranoia, to minimize any priming effects or demand characteristics that might 121 influence participants' eventual reactions to the narrative. Possible scores on the GPTS-A range 122 from 16 to 80; higher scores are generally observed only in clinical populations 21 . In our healthy 123 sample, we observed a right-skewed distribution that nonetheless had some variance (range = 16-124 40, mean = 20.6, s.d. = 6.3; median = 18.5, m.a.d. = 4.0; see Fig. 1b for a histogram of the 125 distribution). This is consistent with observations from much larger sample sizes that trait paranoia 126 follows an exponential, rather than normal, distribution in the healthy population 5,6,21 . 127 128
Story listening evokes widespread neural synchrony 129
Our primary approach for analyzing the fMRI data was inter-subject correlation (ISC), 130 which is a model-free way to identify brain regions responding reliably to a naturalistic stimulus 131 across subjects 16, 17 . In this approach, the timecourse from each voxel in one subject's brain across 132 the duration of the stimulus is correlated with the timecourse of the same voxel in a second 133 subject's brain. Voxels that show high correlations in their timecourses across subjects are 134 considered to have a stereotyped functional role in processing the stimulus. The advantage of this 135 approach is that it does not require the investigator to have an a priori model of the task, nor to 136 assume any fixed hemodynamic response function. 137
In a first-pass analysis, we calculated ISC at each voxel across the whole sample of n = 22 138 participants, using a recently developed statistical approach that relies on a linear mixed-effects 139 model with crossed random effects to appropriately account for the correlation structure of the 140 data 22 . Results are shown in Fig. 2 . As expected given the audio-linguistic nature of the stimulus, 141 ISC was highest in primary auditory cortex and language regions along the superior temporal lobe, 142 but we also observed widespread ISC in other parts of association cortex, including frontal, 143 parietal, midline and temporal areas, as well as the posterior cerebellum. These results replicate 144 previous reports that complex naturalistic stimuli induce stereotyped responses across participants 145 in not only the relevant primary cortex, but also higher-order brain regions 15, 16, 23 . 146 Also as expected, ISC was generally lower or absent in primary motor and somatosensory 147 cortex, although we did observe significant ISC in parts of primary visual cortex, despite the fact 148 that there was no timecourse of visual input during the story. (To encourage engagement, we had 149 participants fixate on a static photograph that was thematically relevant to the story during 150 listening, so the observed ISC in visual cortex may reflect similarities in the timecourse of 151 internally generated imagery across participants.) 152 153
Paranoia modulates neural response to the narrative 154
Having established that story listening evokes widespread neural synchrony across all 155 participants, we next sought to determine if there were brain regions whose degree of ISC was 156 modulated by trait paranoia. Using a median split of GPTS-A scores, we stratified our sample into 157 a low-paranoia (GPTS-A ≤ 18, n = 11) and high-paranoia (GPTS-A ≥ 19, n = 11) group ( Fig. 1b) . 158
We then used the same linear mixed-effects model described above formulated as a two-group 159 contrast to reveal areas that are differentially synchronized across paranoia levels. 160
We opted for a median split rather than using raw paranoia score as a continuous covariate 161 because of the unique challenge of an ISC-based analysis, which, to take advantage of all the 162 information contained in the cross-subject correlation matrix ( Fig. 1c ), requires any covariates to 163 be at the subject pair level, rather than the level of individual subjects. Because trait paranoia is a 164 single scalar value per participant, it is difficult to calculate a meaningful pairwise metric. (Median 165 splits can also mitigate the influence of extreme values, such as the two participants with GPTS-166 A ≥ 38 [cf. Fig. 1b ], ensuring these do not have an outsize effect on the results.) Still, we conducted 167 post-hoc tests to investigate continuous relationships with raw GPTS-A score whenever possible 168 to respect the inherently continuous nature of this trait, and to facilitate interpretation. 169
We were primarily interested in three contrasts. First, which voxels show greater ISC 170 among pairs of high-paranoia participants versus low-paranoia participants, or vice versa? Second 171 and third, which voxels show greater ISC among pairs of low-or high-paranoia participants, 172 respectively (i.e., low-low or high-high), than pairs of participants mismatched for group (i.e., 173 high-low)? All three contrasts reveals regions whose response timecourses are modulated by trait 174 paranoia in some way. These contrasts are schematized in Fig. 1c . 175
Results are shown in Fig. 3 . In the first contrast, several regions emerged as being more 176 synchronized in the high-paranoia group relative to the low-paranoia group. Significant clusters 177 were found in the left temporal pole (Talairach coordinates for center of mass: [+46.7, -10.0, -178 26.2]), left precuneus ([+10.8, +71.0, +35.9]), and two regions of the right medial prefrontal cortex 179 (mPFC; one anterior [-8.1, -46.9, +16.3] and one dorsal [+2.9, -14.8, +45.1]; Fig. 3a ). Searches for 180 these coordinates on Neurosynth, an automated fMRI results synthesizer for mapping between 181 neural and cognitive states 24 , indicated that for the left temporal pole and right anterior mPFC 182 clusters, top meta-analysis terms included "mentalizing", "mental states", "intentions", and 183 "theory mind". There were no regions showing a statistically significant difference in the reverse 184 direction (low-paranoia > high-paranoia). 185
In the second contrast ( Fig. 3b , cool colors), pairs of low-paranoia participants were more 186 synchronized than pairs of inter-group participants in the left lateral occipital gyrus (center of mass: 187 [+31.3, +86.1, +14.0], Neurosynth: "objects", "scene", "encoding"), and in the third contrast ( Fig.  188 3b, warm colors), pairs of high-paranoia participants were more synchronized than pairs of inter-189 group participants in the right angular gyrus ([-44.8, +57.9, +37.9], Neurosynth: "beliefs"). 190
Interestingly, there were no voxels of statistically significant overlap between the second and third 191 contrasts, indicating that no single region had a timecourse that was equally synchronized within 192 groups but qualitatively different between groups. Instead, for most of the regions that emerged 193 from the three contrasts, the relationship between trait paranoia and timecourse synchrony is best 194 expressed by the Anna Karenina principle: all paranoid participants are alike; all not-paranoid 195 participants are not-paranoid in their own way (except in the lateral occipital gyrus, where it is the 196 opposite). 197
As these regions were obtained via dichotomization into groups, we also conducted post-198 hoc tests to determine if ISC remained sensitive to finer-grained differences in trait paranoia. We 199 were primarily interested in two regions that emerged from the first contrast, the left temporal pole 200 and right medial PFC, since these are known from prior literature to be involved in theory of mind 201 and mentalizing. To determine whether ISC in these regions scales monotonically with trait 202 paranoia, we visualized the participant-by-participant ISC matrices with participants ordered by 203 trait paranoia score ( Fig. 4a. 4c ). Visual inspection suggests a relatively continuous increase in ISC 204 values as one moves down and to the right along the diagonal, which represents pairs of 205 increasingly high-paranoia participants. To quantify this, we plotted each participant's median ISC 206 with all other participants (i.e., the median of each row of the ISC matrix) against their paranoia 207 rank within the sample (i.e., 1-22; Fig. 4b and d ). For both ROIs, participants with higher paranoia 208 rank tended to have higher median ISC (rs = 0.71 and rs = 0.63 for the left temporal pole and right 209 medial PFC, respectively; both p < 0.002). We used paranoia rank rather than raw score to mitigate 210 the influence of the two participants with extreme paranoia scores (≥ 38; cf. Fig. 1b ). 211
212
Effects are specific to paranoia 213
We conducted several control analyses to rule out the possibility that the observed group 214 differences were driven by a factor other than trait paranoia. (For all analyses in this section, we 215 checked for both categorical and continuous relationships with paranoia; full results are reported 216
in Table 1. 
) 217
For example, if the high-paranoia participants have better overall attentional and cognitive 218 abilities, they might simply be paying closer attention to the story, inflating ISC values but not 219 necessarily because of selective attention to ambiguous or suspicious details. However, there were 220 no differences between high-and low-paranoia participants on any of the cognitive tasks we 221 administered (verbal IQ, vocabulary, fluid intelligence or working memory), making it unlikely 222 that observed differences are due to trait-level differences in attention or cognition. As for state-223 level attention during the story, there was no relationship between paranoia and number of 224 comprehension questions answered correctly, total word count during the recall task, or self-report 225 measures of engagement and attention. We also explored potential imaging-based confounds, and 226 found that paranoia was not related to amount of head motion during the scan (as measured by 227 mean framewise displacement), number of censored frames, or temporal signal-to-noise ratio 228 (tSNR). Paranoia groups did not differ in age or sex breakdown. Thus we are reasonably confident 229 that the observed effects are driven by true trait-level differences in paranoia between individuals. 230 231
Activity to mentalizing events scales with paranoia 232
Results of the first contrast from the two-group ISC analysis indicated that certain brain 233 regions showed a more stereotyped response in high-paranoia versus low-paranoia individuals. 234
What features of the narrative were driving activity in these regions? In theory, ISC allows for 235 reverse correlation, in which peaks of activation in a given region's timecourse are used to recover 236 the stimulus events that evoked them 16 . In practice, this is often difficult. Especially with narrative 237 stimuli, in which structure is built up over relatively long timescales 15 , it is challenging to pinpoint 238 exactly which event-word, phrase, sentence-triggered an increase in BOLD activity. 239
Rather than rely on reverse correlation, a data-driven decoding approach, we took an 240 encoding approach: we modeled events in the task that we hypothesized would stimulate differing 241 interpretations across individuals, and evaluated the degree to which certain regions of interest 242 (ROIs) responded to such events, using a general linear model (GLM) analysis. Specifically, we 243 labeled sentences in the story when the main character was experiencing an ambiguous (i.e., 244 possibly suspicious) social interaction, and/or sentences when she was explicitly reasoning about 245 the intentions of other characters. For brevity, we refer to these timepoints as "mentalizing events." 246
In creating the regressor, all events were time-locked to the end of the last word of the labeled 247 sentences, when participants are presumably evaluating information they just heard and integrating 248 it into their situation model of the story. 249
We hypothesized that the two ROIs from the previous analysis known to be involved in 250 theory-of-mind and mentalizing, the left temporal pole and right medial PFC, would be more active 251 to mentalizing events in individuals with higher trait paranoia. We included two additional ROIs, 252 the left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and left Heschl's gyrus, as a positive and negative control, 253 respectively. We selected the left TPJ as a positive control because of its well-established role in 254 theory-of-mind and mentalizing processes, and the fact that it emerged as highly synchronized 255 across all participants (cf. For each participant, we regressed the timecourse of each of these four ROIs against the 261 mentalizing-events regressor and compared the resulting regression coefficients between groups 262 ( Fig. 5b ). Compared to low-paranoia individuals, high-paranoia individuals showed stronger 263 responses in both the left temporal pole (two-sample t(20) = 2.71, padj = 0.014) and right medial 264 PFC (t(20) = 3.36, padj = 0.007). As hypothesized, responses in the left TPJ were strong across the 265 whole sample (one-sample t(21) = 8.73, p < 0.0001), but there was no significant difference 266 between groups in this ROI (t(20) = 0.67, padj = 0.34). Also as hypothesized, the sample as a whole 267 did not show a significant response to these events in primary auditory cortex (one-sample t(21) = 268 0.44, p = 0.66), and there was no group difference (t(20) = 0.47, padj = 0.34). 269
To confirm that these results hold if paranoia is treated as a continuous variable, we 270 conducted additional post-hoc tests in which we correlated participants' paranoia ranks and 271 regression coefficients for all four ROIs (Fig. 4c ). As expected, response to suspicious events was 272 significantly related to paranoia rank in the left temporal pole (rs = 0.57, p = 0.005) and right medial 273 PFC (rs = 0.64, p = 0.001), but not in the left TPJ (rs = -0.04, p = 0.86) or left Heschl's gyrus (rs = 274 0.02, p = 0.95). 275
As an additional control, to check that this effect was specific to mentalizing events and 276 not just any sentence offset, we crated an inverse regressor comprising all non-mentalizing events 277 (i.e., by flipping the binary labels from the mentalizing-events regressor, such that all sentences 278 were labeled except those containing an ambiguous social interaction or explicit mentalizing as 279 described above). There were no differences between paranoia groups in any of the four ROIs in 280 response to non-mentalizing sentences (Fig. 4d ), and no continuous relationships between 281 regression coefficient and paranoia rank (Fig. 4e ). This indicates that trait paranoia is associated 282 with differential sensitivity of the left temporal pole and right medial PFC to not just any 283 information, but specifically to socially ambiguous information that presumably triggers theory-284 of-mind processes. Immediately following the scan, participants completed a post-narrative battery that 294 consisted of free-speech prompts followed by multiple-choice items to characterize their beliefs 295 and feelings about the story. For the first item, participants were asked to retell the story in as much 296 detail as they could remember, and their speech was recorded. Participants were allowed to speak 297 for as long as they wished on whatever aspects of the story they chose. Without guidance from the 298 experimenter, participants recalled the story in rich detail, speaking an average of 1,081 words 299 Using partial least-squares regression, we searched for relationships between speech 307 features and trait paranoia score. More than 72 percent of the variance in paranoia score could be 308 accounted for by the first component of speech features; the loadings of semantic and syntactic 309 categories for this component are visualized in Fig. 6a . The feature with the highest positive 310 loading-indicating a positive relationship with paranoia-was affiliation, a category of words 311 describing social and familial relationships (e.g., 'ally', 'friend', 'social'). Also associated with 312 high trait paranoia was frequent use of adjectives as well as anxiety-and risk-related words (e.g., 313
'bad', 'crisis'); drives, a meta-category that includes words concerning affiliation, achievement, 314 power, reward and risk; and health-related words (e.g., 'clinic', 'fever', 'infected'; recall that the 315 story featured a doctor treating patients in a remote village; cf. Supplementary Note 1). Features 316 with strongly negative loadings-indicating an inverse relationship with paranoia-included male 317 references (e.g., 'him', 'his', 'man', 'father'); anger-related words ('yell', 'annoyed'); function 318 words ('it', 'from', 'so', 'with'); and conjunctions ('and', 'but', 'until'). Fig. 6b contains specific 319 examples for selected categories from participants' speech transcripts. 320
After the free-speech prompts, participants answered a series of multiple-choice questions 321 (see Supplementary Table 1 for the full questionnaire). First, they were asked to rate the degree to 322 which they were experiencing various emotions (suspicion, paranoia, sadness, happiness, 323 confusion, anxiety, etc; 16 in total) on a scale from 1 to 5. Most of ratings skewed low-for 324 example, the highest paranoia rating was 3, and only six subjects rated their paranoia level higher 325 than 1. Interestingly, there was no significant correlation between trait paranoia score and self-326 reported paranoia (rs = -0.02, p = 0.91) or suspicion (rs = 0.11, p = 0.62) following the story. Neither 327 were any of the other emotion ratings significantly correlated with trait-level paranoia (all 328 uncorrected p > 0.12; see Fig. 6c ). 329
Second, participants were asked to rate the three central characters on six personality 330 dimensions (trustworthy, impulsive, considerate, intelligent, likeable, naïve; see Supplementary 331 Fig. 1a ). Third, they were asked to rate the likelihood of each of six scenarios (see Supplementary 332 However, to facilitate comparison with the speech data, we submitted the questionnaire data to a 336 second partial least-squares regression to search for multidimensional relationships. This analysis 337 revealed a first component of questionnaire responses that accounted for 62 percent of the variance 338 in trait paranoia ( Supplementary Fig. 1c ). Features with the highest positive loadings, indicating a 339 positive relationship with paranoia, included certain answers about what individuals thought the 340 main character might do next as well as what they would do in her place (e.g., escape from the 341 situation), as well as feeling more uncomfortable and suspicious following the story. Features with 342 the highest negative loadings, indicating an inverse relationship with paranoia, included feeling 343 more amused, inspired and hopeful following the story, as well a tendency to agree with one of 344 the scenarios ("Juan and the other villagers had not known anything about the disease before 345
Carmen arrived"). 346
Overall, then, we found signatures of paranoia in story-evoked behavior using both free 347 speech and self-report measures. Participants' free speech was slightly more sensitive than their 348 answers on the multiple-choice questionnaire. Self-report is a coarse measure that may suffer from 349 response bias; behavior provides a richer feature set that allows for the discovery of more subtle 350 associations. In studying nuanced individual differences, then, these results highlight the 351 desirability of capturing behavior in both traditional and naturalistic ways. to an identical stimulus. Previous work using naturalistic tasks has shown that brain activity and 358 behavioral responses are sensitive to experimenter instructions, i.e., an explicit prime 19,20 , or to the 359 nature of the stimulus itself, i.e., whether it is more or less compelling or entertaining 26-28 . The 360 present study extends these results in an important new direction, suggesting that there is 361 substantial implicit variation in the brain's response to a naturalistic stimulus that stems from trait-362 level individual differences. 363
Our results have implications for the neural correlates of both trait-and state-related 364 paranoia. Those with higher trait paranoia may have more stereotyped brain responses because 365 suspicious and/or paranoid schemas come to mind more readily for these individuals; the idea that 366 certain individuals tend to engage certain constructs more frequently across time and situations 367 has been termed "chronic accessibility" 29 . The relative hyperactivity of theory-of-mind regions to 368 mentalizing events in high-paranoia individuals fits with the conception of paranoia as "over-369 mentalizing", or the tendency to excessively attribute (malevolent) intentions to other people's 370 actions 30 . Both regions of differential response, the temporal pole and medial PFC, are sometimes, 371 but not always, reported in theory-of-mind tasks broadly construed; individual differences may at 372 least partially explain the inconsistencies in the literature 31 . 373
While the present study included only healthy controls with subclinical paranoia, it may 374 provide a useful starting point for the study of paranoid or persecutory delusions in schizophrenia 375 and related illnesses. Delusions with a persecutory theme account for roughly 70-80 percent of all 376 delusions. This high prevalence is stable across time 32 and geo-cultural factors 33-36 , suggesting a 377 strong biological component. Persecutory delusions are also the type most strongly associated with 378 anger and most likely to be acted upon, especially in a violent manner 37 . Thus, understanding the 379 neurobiological basis of paranoid delusions is a critical problem in psychiatry. 380
But because delusions typically have a slow, insidious onset, it is nearly impossible to 381 retrospectively recover triggering events in individual patients. A related challenge is that while 382 thematically similar, each patient's delusion is unique in its details. Thus it is difficult to devise 383 material that will evoke comparable responses across patients. One solution is to craft a model 384 context using a stimulus that is ambiguous yet controlled-i.e., identical across participants, 385 permitting meaningful comparisons of time-locked evoked activity-such as the one used in this 386 work. Paradigms such as this one may shed light on mechanisms of delusion formation and/or 387 provide eventual diagnostic or prognostic value. 388
While there is little work investigating brain activity during naturalistic stimuli in 389 psychiatric populations, a handful of studies have used such paradigms in autism, finding that 390 autistic individuals are less synchronized with one another and with typically developing controls 391 while watching movies of social interactions [38] [39] [40] . Notably, the degree of asynchrony scales with 392 autism-spectrum phenotype severity in both the patient and control groups 39 . It is interesting to 393 juxtapose these reports with the present results, in which individuals with a stronger paranoia 394 phenotype were more synchronized during exposure to socially relevant material; ultimately, this 395 fits with the notion of autism and psychosis as opposite ends of the same spectrum, involving 396 hypo-and hyper-mentalization, respectively 41, 42 . Future studies should combine naturalistic 397 stimuli with ISC-based analyses that cut across diagnostic labels to examine how neural responses 398 vary across the full range of human phenotypes. 399
From a methodological perspective, much of the fMRI research on individual differences 400 has shifted in recent years from measuring activation in task-based conditions to measuring 401 functional connectivity, predominantly at rest 43-47 . Both paradigms suffer from limitations: 402 traditional tasks are so tightly controlled that they often lack ecological validity; resting-state 403 scans, on the other hand, are entirely unconstrained, making it difficult to separate signal from 404 noise. Naturalistic tasks may be a happy medium for studying both group-level functional brain 405 organization as well as individual differences 48, 49 . We and others argue that such tasks could serve 406 as a "stress test" to draw out individual variation in brain and behaviors of interest 50-54 , enhancing 407 signal in the search for neuroimaging-based biomarkers and permitting more precise inferences 408 about the sources of individual differences in neural activity. Research Center. After an initial localizing scan, a high-resolution 3D volume was collected using 467 a magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence (208 contiguous sagittal slices, 468 slice thickness = 1 mm, matrix size 256 × 256, field of view = 256 mm, TR = 2400 ms, TE = 1.9 469 ms, flip angle = 8°). Functional images were acquired using a multiband T2*-sensitive gradient-470 recalled single shot echo-planar imaging pulse sequence (TR = 1000 ms, TE = 30 ms, voxel size 471 = 2.0mm 3 , flip angle = 60°, bandwidth = 1976 Hz/pixel, matrix size = 110 × 110, field of view = 472 220 mm × 220 mm, multiband factor = 4). 473
We acquired the following functional scans: 1) an initial eyes-open resting-state run 474 (6:00/360 TRs in duration) during which subjects were instructed to relax and think of nothing in 475 particular; 2) a movie-watching run using Inscapes 58 (7:00/420 TRs); 3) three narrative-listening 476 runs corresponding to parts 1, 2 and 3 of the story (21:50/1310 TRs in total); and 4) a post-477 narrative, eyes-open resting-state run (6:00/360 TRs) during which subjects were instructed to 478 reflect on the story they had just heard. The present work focuses exclusively on data acquired 479 during narrative listening. The narrative stimulus was delivered through MRI-compatible audio 480 headphones and a short "volume check" scan was conducted just prior to the first narrative run to 481 ensure that participants could adequately hear the stimulus above the scanner noise. To promote 482 engagement, during the three narrative runs, participants were asked to fixate on a static image of 483 a jungle settlement and to actively imagine the story events as they unfolded. norm of the motion derivatives) was ≥0.3 or when ≥10% of the brain voxels were outliers. 495
Censored time points were set to zero rather than removed altogether (this is the conventional way 496 to do censoring, but especially important for inter-subject correlation analyses, to preserve the 497 temporal structure across participants). The final output of this preprocessing pipeline was a single 498 functional run concatenating data from the three story runs (total duration = 21:50, 1310 TRs). All 499 analyses were conducted in volume space and projected to the surface for visualization purposes. 500
We used mean framewise displacement (MFD), a per-participant summary metric, to 501 assess the amount of head motion in the sample. MFD was overall relatively low (after censoring: 502 mean = 0.075 mm, s.d. = 0.026, range = 0.035-0.14). Number of censored time points during the 503 story was overall low but followed a right-skewed distribution (range = 0-135, median = 4, median 504 absolute deviation = 25). All 22 participants in the final analysis retained at least 89 percent of the 505 total time points in the story, so missing data was not a substantial concern. Still, we performed 506 additional control analyses to ensure that number of censored timepoints and amount of head 507 motion were not associated with paranoia score in any way that would confound interpretation of 508 the results (see Table 1 ). 509 510
Inter-subject correlation 511
Following preprocessing, inter-subject correlation (ISC) during the story was computed 512 across all possible pairs of subjects (i,j) using AFNI's 3dTcorrelate function, resulting in 231 513 (n*(n-1)/2, where n = 22) unique ISC maps, where the value at each voxel represents the Pearson's 514 correlation between that voxel's timecourse in subject i and its timecourse in subject j. 515
To identify voxels demonstrating statistically significant ISC across all 231 subject pairs, 516
we performed inference at the single-group level using a recently developed linear mixed-effects 517 (LME) model with a crossed random-effects formulation to accurately account for the correlation 518 structure embedded in the ISC data 22 . This approach has been characterized extensively, including 519 a comparison to non-parametric approaches, and found to demonstrate proper control for false 520 positives and good power attainment 22 . The resulting map was corrected for multiple comparisons 521 and thresholded for visualization using a voxelwise false discovery rate threshold of q < 0.001 522 (Fig. 2) . 523
In a second analysis, we stratified participants according to a median split of scores on the 524 GPTS-A subscale. We used these groups to identify voxels that had higher ISC values within one 525 paranoia group or the other, or higher ISC values within rather than across paranoia groups. To 526 this end, we used a two-group formulation of the LME model. This model gives the following 527 outputs: voxelwise population ISC values within group 1 (G11); voxelwise population ISC values 528 within group 2 (G22); voxelwise population ISC values between the two groups that reflect the ISC 529 effect between any pair of subjects with each belonging to different groups (G12). These outputs 530
can be compared to obtain several possible contrasts. Here, we were primarily interested in three 531 of these contrasts: 1) G11 versus G22, 2) G11 versus G12, and 3) G22 versus G12. The maps resulting 532 from each of these contrasts were thresholded using an initial voxelwise threshold of p < 0.002 533 and controlled for family-wise error (FWE) using a cluster size threshold of 50 voxels, 534 corresponding to a corrected p-value of 0.05. We opted for a particularly stringent initial p-535 threshold in light of recent concerns about false positives arising from performing cluster 536 correction on maps with more lenient initial thresholds 59 . 537 538
Event-related analysis 539
Creating the regressor. A forced-aligner (Gentle; https://lowerquality.com/gentle/) was 540
used to obtain precise timing information for each word in the narrative, by aligning the audio file 541 with its transcript. One of the authors (E.S.F.) manually labeled sentences containing either an 542 ambiguous social interaction or an instance of the main character mentalizing about other 543 characters' intentions using a binary scoring system (1 = ambiguous social interaction or 544 mentalizing present in sentence, 0 = neither ambiguous social interaction nor mentalizing present). 545
Four additional, independent raters previously naïve to the narrative listened to the same version 546 that was played to participants in the scanner. They were then given a written version of the 547 narrative broken down by sentence and asked to label each sentence as described above. Sentences 548 that were labeled by at least three of the five raters were included in the final set of events. There 549 were 48 sentences that met this criteria, with 17, 13 and 18 occurring in parts 1, 2 and 3 of the 550 narrative, respectively. 551
Events were timestamped based on the TR corresponding to the offset of the last word of 552 each labeled sentence. These timestamps were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response 553 function (HRF) to create the mentalizing-events regressor. Our assumption that evaluation and 554 integration would happen primarily at the end of the sentence was based on theories of text 555 comprehension, which hold that readers/listeners segment continuous linguistic information online 556 into larger units of meaning, or "macropropositions"; the mental models that listeners use to 557 represent narratives are thus updated primarily at event boundaries 60-62 . Empirical neurobiological 558 support for this comes from Whitney et al. 63 , who showed, using a 23-minute continuous narrative 559 stimulus, that sentence boundaries coinciding with narrative shifts-defined as shifts in character, 560 time, location, or action-evoked more brain activity than sentence boundaries not coincident 561 with such shifts. Additional neuroimaging evidence comes from Zacks et al. 64 , who demonstrated 562 transient changes in brain activity that were time-locked to event boundaries during movie 563 viewing. 564
However, some degree of evaluation and integration could also be happening online as 565 participants listen to the event, and ideally the results from the regression would not depend on 566 methodological choices about which parts of the sentence to model. To test this, we created a 567 second version of the regressor, this time treating the entire sentence as a mini-block by modeling 568 all TRs in each of the labeled sentences. Results were unchanged (see Supplementary Fig. 2 ). Thus 569 we are confident that the results are robust to this methodological choice. 570
As a control analysis, we also created a regressor that was the inverse of the above 571 regressor, by flipping the binary labels (0 or 1) for all sentences and convolving the corresponding 572 sentences offset timestamps with the HRF; we refer to this as the non-mentalizing-events 573 regressor. 574 Timecourses for each ROI were extracted from each participant's preprocessed functional 582 data using AFNI's 3dmaskave function and regressed against both the mentalizing-and non-583 mentalizing-events regressors to obtain a regression coefficient for each participant for each ROI. 584
These regression coefficients were then compared across groups using two-sample t-tests corrected 585 for four multiple comparisons. In the case of the two control ROIs (TPJ and Heschl's gyrus) for 586 the mentalizing-events regressor, these coefficients were also pooled across both groups and 587 submitted to a one-sample t-test to test for a significant deviation from zero. 588 589 Free speech capture 590 Immediately following their exit from the scanner, we gave participants the following 591 prompts and recorded their speech: (1) "Please retell the story in as much detail as you can 592 remember"; and (2) "What did you think of the story as a whole? In particular, did anything strike 593 you as strange or confusing? How do you feel after listening to the story?" Here we focus on data 594 acquired from the first prompt, as participants consistently talked for much longer to this one than 595 to the second one (since they tended to preempt answers to second prompt in their answer to the 596 first). 597 598
Multiple-choice questionnaire 599
Following the free-speech prompts, we had participants complete a computerized multiple-600 choice questionnaire to assess their feelings toward and beliefs about the story. A full list of items 601 is provided in Supplementary Table 1 ; there were 47 in total. 602 603
Analysis of speech features 604
Audio recordings of participants' retelling of the story were professionally transcribed by 605 a third-party company. We submitted the resulting transcripts to Linguistic Inquiry and Word 606 Count (LIWC; www.liwc.net) 25 , a software program that takes as input a given text and counts the 607 percentage of words falling into different syntactic and semantic categories. Because LIWC was 608 developed by researchers with interests in social, clinical, health, and cognitive psychology, the 609 language categories were created to capture people's social and psychological states. 610
We restricted LIWC output to the 67 linguistic (syntactic and semantic) categories, 611 excluding categories relating to metadata (e.g., percentage of words found in the LIWC 612 dictionary), as well as categories irrelevant to spoken language (e.g., punctuation). Thus, our final 613 LIWC output was a 22x67 matrix where each row corresponds to a participant and each column 614 to a category. 615
These categories can be scaled very differently from one another. For example, words in 616 the syntactic category "pronoun" accounted for between 10.3-20.5 percent of speech transcripts, 617 while words in the semantic category "leisure" accounted for only 0-1.09 percent. To give 618 approximately equal weight to all categories, we standardized each category (to have zero mean 619 unit variance) across participants before performing partial least squares regression (PLSR) as 620 described in the next section. This ensures that the resulting PLS components are not simply 621 dominated by variance in categories that are represented heavily in all human speech. 622 623
Relating story-evoked behavior to paranoia 624
To determine which speech features were most related to trait paranoia, we submitted the 625 data to a partial least squares regression (PLSR) with the z-scored speech features as X (predictors) 626 and trait paranoia score as Y (response), implemented in Matlab as plsregress. PLSR is a latent 627 variable approach to modeling the covariance structure between two matrices, which seeks to find 628 the direction in X space that explains the maximum variance in Y space. It is well suited to the 629 current problem, because it can handle a predictor matrix with more variables than observations, 630 as well as multi-collinearity among the predictors. 631
In a first-pass analysis, we ran a model with 10 components to determine the number of 632 components needed to explain most of the variance in trait paranoia. Results of this analysis 633 indicated that the first component was sufficient to explain 72.3 percent of the total variance in 634 paranoia score, so we selected just this component for visualization and interpretation. Feature 635 loadings for this component are visualized in Fig. 6a . 636
In a parallel analysis, we submitted participants' answers to the multiple-choice 637 questionnaire to a PLSR as the X (predictor) matrix, again with paranoia score as the Y (response) 638 variable. Results of this analysis indicated that the first component was sufficient to explain 61.5 639 percent of the variance in paranoia score. Feature loadings for this component are visualized in 640 Supplementary Fig. 1c . 641 642
Data availability 643
Source data generated during this study, including raw MRI data and the full narrative narrative listening in all participants (n = 22). As expected, the highest ISC values were observed 839 in auditory cortex, but several regions of association cortex in the temporal, parietal, frontal and 840 cingulate lobes as well as the cerebellum also showed high synchrony. Also included are three 841 representative axial slices from the cerebellum. Results are displayed at a voxelwise false-842 discovery rate (FDR) threshold of q < 0.001). 843 844 845 846 Figure 3 . Trait-level paranoia modulates patterns of inter-subject correlation during 847 narrative listening. a) Results frma whole-brain, voxelwise contrast revealing brain regions that 848 are more synchronized between pairs of high-paranoia participants than pairs of low-paranoia 849 participants (contrast schematized in top panel, cf. Fig. 1C ). Significant clusters were detected in 850 the left temporal pole, two regions in the right medial prefrontal cortex (one anterior and one dorsal 851 and posterior), and the left precuneus. No clusters were detected in the opposite direction (low > 852 high). b) Results from two whole-brain, voxelwise contrasts revealing brain regions that are more 853 synchronized within a paranoia group than across paranoia groups. The first contrast revealed that 854 left lateral occipital cortex was more synchronized within the low-paranoia group (i.e., low-low 855 pairs) than across groups (i.e., high-low pairs; contrast schematized in top panel, cf. Fig 1C) . The 856 second contrast revealed that right angular gyrus was more synchronized within the high-paranoia 857 group (i.e., high-high pairs) than across groups. For all three contrasts, results are shown at an 858 initial threshold of p < 0.002 with cluster correction corresponding to p < 0.05. sentences from participant speech transcripts containing words falling into the three of the top 908 positive categories (affiliation, health and anxiety) and one of the top negative categories (anger). 909 c) Rank correlations between participants' trait-level paranoia and their self-report measures of 16 910 emotions following the narrative (self-report was based on a Likert scale from 1 to 5). Dotted lines 911 represent approximate threshold for a significant correlation a p < 0.05 (uncorrected). Gray shaded 912 area indicates non-significance. 913 "…but they become friends once she gets to know her better." "…there were a series of patients that had a fever accompanied by a rash…" "…she almost panicked…" "…and she yells at him…" 
